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Accounting Earnings Announcements, Institutional Investor Concentration, and Common Stock 
Returns 
 
1. Introduction 
This study examines the relation between the level of institutional investor ownership and the 
magnitude of security price variability at quarterly earnings announcement dates. Prior research 
consistently documents a negative association between firm size and announcement-date return 
variability. One explanation for this finding is that as more timely, alternative information becomes 
available on large firms prior to an announcement date, their security prices become informative, 
thereby reducing the information content of the earnings announcement. Large firms are closely 
followed by institutional investors. These investors dedicate substantial resources to information 
search. Therefore, the link between size and information production may be attributable to the 
influence of institutional investors on the information production process.1 Because institutional 
trades can also affect security prices, however, the precise impact of institutional following on the 
variability of prices at quarterly earnings dates is not evident. 
Evidence obtained principally from a cross-sectional regression of announcement-date stock 
price variability on firm size, earnings response coefficients, earnings variability, and the 
percentage of institutional holdings indicates that the degree of price variability at quarterly 
announcement dates increases with the level of institutional investor ownership. This result 
suggests that the alternative information gathered by institutions is unlikely to preempt that 
conveyed by the quarterly earnings announcement. 
The sample selection criteria and variable definitions are described in section 2. Section 3 
presents the descriptive data and the results of the empirical tests. Concluding remarks are presented 
in section 4. 
                                            
1 Atiase [1985] and Zeghal [1984] find that the returns of small firms during announcement periods are on average 
more variable than the announcement-period returns of large firms. Freeman [1987] reports that the prices of large 
firms reflect the information content of an upcoming earnings report earlier than the prices of small firms. These 
results are consistent with the view that the amount of firm-specific private information production and 
dissemination activities is positively correlated with firm size. The Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate 
Disclosure (SEC [1977]) and The Institutional Investor Study Report (SEC [1971]), IISR, document that institutional 
investors dedicate significant resources to information production and tend to concentrate their holdings in large 
firms. O’Brien and Bhushan [1990] find strong positive correlations between security analyst following, institutional 
investors, and firm size. Moreover, they find that decisions of analysts to follow firms may be accompanied by 
simultaneous decisions of institutions to adjust their holdings commensurate with size changes. 
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2. Description of Sample and Variable Definitions 
Sample firms met the following criteria: (1) listed on the NYSE during 1979-85, (2) daily CRSP 
return data and quarterly Compustat earnings announcement dates for the fiscal years 1979-85, and 
(3) quarterly earnings per share on Compustat from 1976-85. Six hundred fifty-eight firms met the 
criteria. 1979 is chosen as the beginning year because mandatory reporting of institutional holdings 
begins on this date. Requiring data from 1979 through 1985, the most restrictive criterion, ensures 
a long enough time series to estimate some of the variables used in the study; results are similar 
when this requirement is relaxed. 
Institutional concentration, PIH, is measured as the percentage of a firm’s outstanding common 
shares held by institutional investors at the beginning of a calendar year. This information is hand-
collected for 1979, 1981, 1983, and 1985 from Spectrum 3.2 Size, MV, is defined as the market 
value of common equity at the beginning of the fiscal quarter. 
Forecasted quarterly earnings for each firm and quarter are estimated from Foster’s [1977] 
univariate time-series model3 using the previous 12 quarterly earnings observations: 
 
where: 
EPSiq = earnings per share of firm i in quarter q. 
A forecast error, FEiq, is constructed as FEiq = EPSiq - E[EPSiq], A standard deviation of quarterly 
earnings, aFEiq, is also constructed using the error terms from the estimation periods. 
Residual returns are computed as: 
 
where: 
                                            
2 Firms not listed in the Spectrum 3 publication but meeting the other criteria are included in the sample and defined 
as having no institutional holdings. Virtually all NYSE firms are held by institutions and therefore are in Spectrum 3. 
Since 12/31/78, Securities Act Rule 13f-l requires all institutional investment managers with discretion over equity 
accounts exceeding $100 million to disclose their holdings. This information is compiled in the Spectrum publication 
published quarterly by Computer Directions Advisors. Value Line and Disclosure report summary Spectrum 
information. 
3 Results (not reported) based on IBES forecasts (where available) and on forecasts from seasonal random walk model 
with a drift are not substantively different. 
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Rit = return on security i over the two-day period t, 
Rmt = equally weighted market return over the two-day period t,  
ai, ßi = parameters, estimated using 100 two-day returns prior to and 100 two-day 
returns immediately   following the 60-day period ending with the quarterly 
earnings announcement. 
The announcement period, t = 0, is the Compustat earnings announcement day and the trading day 
immediately preceding it. A 60-day quarterly return, QRiq, is computed as QRiq = ∑ 𝑢𝑢0𝑡𝑡= −29 it, where 
t = -29, - 28. .  .  0 denotes successive two-day intervals. 
An earnings response coefficient, ECi, is estimated over the 28 firm-quarters: QRiq = ai + ECi 
(FEiq/Piq-1) + ziq, where Piq-1 = the stock price at the beginning of the quarter q.
Announcement-period return variability is measured following Patell [1976]:4 
 
where: 
 
An average U statistic is then computed for each firm as: 
 
3. Results 
Table 1 displays the total equity market value, MV, of the sample firms and the amount held by 
institutional investors (funds) at the beginning of 1979, 1981, 1983, and 1985. The percentage of 
the sample’s market value owned by institutional investors increases from 34.4% in 1979 to 45.5% 
in 1985. Positive correlations between the natural log of market value (In MV) and the percentage 
of fund holdings (PIH) are consistent with previous research that documents institutions’ tendency 
                                            
4 For purposes of computing the U statistic the return parameters ai, and ßi  estimated using the 129 two-day returns 
preceding, and the 100 two-day returns immediately following, the announcement.  
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to invest in large firms. 
Panel A of table 2 provides summary data on the variables examined in this study. Firm-specific 
measures of market value, institutional holdings, and earnings varability are constructed by 
averaging the time series of observations over the 1979-85 period. The mean U statistic of 1.63 is 
consistent with previous studies that document increased return 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
variability during announcement periods. The market value data indicate sample firms are large, 
with a median market value of $495 million, and with substantial variation in both market value 
and percentage institutional holdings across firms. The institutional holdings range from 1.8% to 
75.8% of the common equity value of sample firms. The average quarterly standard deviation of 
earnings, aFEi, and the earnings coefficients, ECi, statistics also display considerable cross-sectional 
variation. These latter statistics are comparable to those reported in Lipe [1990], estimated with 
annual data. A Kolmogorov test (not reported) rejects the normality of each distribution. Therefore, 
the natural log of the variables is reported in the work presented below.5 
Panel B of table 2 presents the pairwise Pearson correlations for the logged variables. The 
negative correlation between market value and announcement-period variability is consistent with 
previous studies which document an inverse relationship between firm size and the variability of 
stock prices at earnings dates. The percentage of institutional holdings is positively related to U. 
Earnings variability, aFEi, is positively related to announcement-period return variability. This 
relation is similar to Pincus [1983] who finds that earnings predictability (the inverse of variability) 
                                            
5 If the earnings coefficient is negative, the log is taken of the absolute value of EC,. The parameters in the regression 
tests in table 3 are also estimated using the ranks of the variables, with no substantive differences in results. 
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is negatively related to announcement-period return variability over interim periods. Lastly, the 
earnings coefficients, ECi, are negatively related to U.6 
Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients and their absolute 7-statistics from the cross-sectional 
linear regressions relating the firm-specific announcement variability U statistic to predictor 
variables. The results from the regression  
 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
 
which includes only MV and PIH reveal that return variability at quarterly earnings announcements 
decreases with size and increases with institutional concentration. These relations are consistent 
with the pairwise correlations reported above. The unrestricted regression includes earnings 
variability (aFEi), earnings coefficients (ECi), and six industry dummy variables in addition to 
market value and institutional concentration. Inclusion of these additional eight variables 
significantly increases the explanatory power of the regression (F = 3.41, p < .001). The 
coefficients on MV and PIH remain different from zero.7 
These results suggest it is unlikely that the alternative information gathered by institutions 
preempts that conveyed by the quarterly earnings announcement. This finding, however, may be 
sensitive to the effects of other variables not included in the analysis. Potential explanatory 
variables include the number of analysts following the firm (NANAL), its systematic (BETA) or 
unsystematic (aRET) risk, the percentage of shares traded (PTR), the average daily number of block 
trades (DBLK), the average daily volume (DVOL), the average daily number of transactions 
(DTNUM), and the average daily trade size (DTSIZE).8 The association of these variables with PIH 
is examined below and in table 4. 
                                            
6 Lipe [1990] reports similar correlations between market value, earnings predictability, and earnings coefficients 
using annual data for 143 NYSE firms. 
7 The sensitivity of the estimated coefficients to influential observations and multi- collinearity conditions is examined 
using procedures outlined in Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch [1980]. No severe multicollinearity or influential observation 
problems are identified. In addition, a Kolmogorov test indicates the regression residuals are normally distributed. 
8 Daily trading information is estimated from the 10/84 to 4/85 transaction data produced by Fitch, Inc. 
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It has been suggested in a number of studies that analyst following influences the amount of 
information collected on firms (Shores [1990] and Lobo and Mahmoud [1989]). The high positive 
correlation between analysts and institutions reported in table 4 is consistent with the belief that the 
information search activities of analysts are in part driven by institutional interests. This positive 
association, however, would suggest less stock price variability at announcement dates, not more. 
Systematic and unsystematic risk are examined based on Verrecchia’s [1982] finding that the 
informativeness of price increases with the risk tolerance of traders. There is little correlation 
between unsystematic risk and institutional concentration. The positive correlation between 
institutional holdings and systematic risk as reported by O’Brien and Bhushan [1990] suggests 
greater risk tolerance on the part of institutional investors rather than less, a finding inconsistent 
with the price variability results documented above. 
 
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
 
 
Verrecchia also shows that the informativeness of price increases as supply noise (the variability 
of the per-capita supply of the risky asset) decreases. Bhushan [1989] models supply noise as 
trading volume and documents that trading volume is negatively correlated with the 
informativeness of prices. The positive correlations between percentage trading volume (PTR) and 
institutional concentration reported here indicate that the supply noise argument is consistent with 
the findings of this study. Appending percentage trading to the regressions in table 3, however, has 
little impact on the PIH coefficients.9 
Unlike the “large market” method of analysis, where the theoretical results rely on the 
assumption that there are numerous traders, Kyle [1989] models informed speculation with 
imperfect competition. In Kyle’s model imperfect competition allows large traders to take into 
account how their own trading will affect prices; the result is that prices are less informative than 
prices in a market with perfect competition. The difference in informativeness is due to the 
                                            
9 The unrestricted regression in table 3 is reestimated by individually including NANAL, BETA, aRET, and PTR. The 
addition of these variables does not explain the positive association between return variability and PIH. 
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sensitivity of market price to the trader’s determined valuation. 
The daily trading information presented in table 4 documents an association between institutions 
and trading activity. The partial correlations indicate that, after controlling for the other variables, 
daily trading volume (DVOL) is not related to PIH and that the number of daily trades (DTNUM) 
is negatively related to PIH. Transaction size (DTSIZE) and number of block trades (DBLK) are 
positively related to the percentage of institutional ownership. Taken together, these relations reveal 
that a concentration of institutional investor ownership results in fewer larger trades. To the extent 
that large trades affect security prices (Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers [1987]), imperfect 
competition may be more prevalent in securities owned by institutions. Under such a scenario a 
positive relation between return variability at earnings announcements and institutional holdings is 
partly due to strategic limitations on trading by institutions prior to the announcement. This 
behavior results in less informative prices prior to the announcement and, hence, a larger 
announcement-date reaction. 
There are other possible explanations for the findings presented here. The results may be due to 
operating differences in the types of firms institutions hold. For instance, institutional investors 
may concentrate their ownership in high-growth and high-beta securities.10 This study controls for 
the effects of earnings variability, earnings coefficients, beta, and industry. Alternatively, the results 
may be driven by the effects of other stockholders, such as insiders, whose ownership positions are 
correlated with the percentage of institutional ownership.11 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This research finds a positive association between percentage institutional ownership and 
                                            
10 This explanation was suggested to me by the portfolio manager of a large balanced-equity fund. The IISR study 
referenced in n. 1 documented that in 1969 institutional concentration was positively related to both return on equity 
and beta. The sample’s correlation (partial correlation) between average annual return on equity (1979-85) and PIH is 
.227 (-.023). The correlation (partial correlation) between average annual sales growth over the seven-year period 
and PIH is - .031 (- .055). 
11 This potentially confounding variable was pointed out by the referee. To provide some insight into the effects of 
correlated omitted variables, I compare the change in a firm’s PIH, denoted CPIH, from calendar year 1979 to calendar 
year 1985 (CPIH = PIH8S - PIH19) with the change in a firm’s Ü statistic, denoted CU, over the same period (CU = Um - 
U79). The Pearson and Spearman correlations between CU and CPIH are .056 (p = .15, two-tailed) and .086 (p = .03), 
respectively. I also construct a two-sample mean (median) test to compare the CU statistics of the 20% of firms with 
the largest CPIH against the CU statistics of the 20% of firms with , the smallest CPIH. The mean CU for the 20% of 
firms with the largest and smallest changes in PIH are .501 and - .254, respectively, resulting in a difference of .755 (p 
= .03). The median difference in CU is .221 (p = .09). These results are consistent with the relations documented in the 
body of the paper. They suggest that the association between PIH and U is not just a function of omitted correlated 
variables. 
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security price variability at quarterly earnings announcements after controlling for size. This result 
is consistent with the view that a concentration of institutional investor ownership reduces the 
informativeness of prices prior to an earnings announcement. Further research is needed to 
determine whether it is institutional investor presence in the information markets, the structure of 
institutional trading in the capital market, or some other factors not incorporated in this research 
design which produces this result. 
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